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VII. BOOKS AND MAGAZINES
A. Defamation
1. Jurisdictional Analysis: No Room For The First Amendment
The United States Supreme Court apparently didn't like the idea of
reading old news twice and sent the first amendment to the back of the
newsrack when it decided the case of Calder v. Jones.' The Court deter-
mined that California had personal jurisdiction over a reporter and an
editor of the National Enquirer, who had written and published a story
about entertainer Shirley Jones. As a result, both individual defendants
were compelled to come to California to answer for their allegedly
libelous and intentional actions, even though the story was written in
Florida and Shirley Jones lived in California.2
The Enquirer published an article on October 9, 1979, which stated
that Shirley Jones3 drank so heavily that she was unable to work.4 Jones
and her husband subsequently filed suit in California Superior Court for
libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
lain Calder, John South, the Enquirer, and its local distributing company
were named as defendants.5
At the time, John South was a reporter for the Enquirer. Although
he had often visited California, he lived and worked in Florida.6 South
had written the first draft and did most of his research in Florida for the
Jones article-relying only on telephone calls to California for his infor-
mation. He had no other relevant contacts with California, though he
did call Jones's husband prior to publication in order to elicit comments
on the story.7
lain Calder, South's co-defendant, was the president and editor of
the Enquirer. Like South, Calder was a Florida resident. He had been to
California only twice-once on a pleasure trip prior to the publication of
the Jones article, and once to testify in an unrelated trial. He had no
1. - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1482 (1984).
2. Id. at 1488.
3. Shirley Jones is a professional entertainer who has appeared on stage, movie screen,
and television. Many remember her from the motion picture musical, "Oklahoma," and her
role as Mrs. Shirley Partridge in the TV musical series, "The Partridge Family."
4. 104 S. Ct. at 1487 n.9.
5. Shirley Jones's husband subsequently filed a voluntary dismissal of his complaint. Id.
at 1484 n.1.
6. Id. at 1485.
7. Id.
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other relevant contacts with California.'
Calder viewed and approved the initial evaluation of the story and
edited its final form. In addition, he refused to reprint a retraction re-
quested by Jones.9
Both men were employed by the Enquirer, a Florida corporation
with its principal place of business in Florida. The Enquirer published a
national weekly newspaper which had a total circulation of over five mil-
lion at the time. Some 600,000 of those issues were sold in California-
twice the amount of any other state.10
The defendants were served with process by mail in Florida and en-
tered special appearances, moving to quash service of process for lack of
personal jurisdiction.1 The superior court dismissed the action. It rea-
soned that requiring reporters to defend a suit in a distant forum would
create a chilling effect on the freedom of the press and impermissibly
violate the first amendment.' 2
The California Court of Appeal reversed. It found that neither
South nor Calder, by virtue of their status as members of the press, had
special first amendment privileges. 3
Furthermore, because of the allegedly intentional harm they had
caused to Shirley Jones, it was reasonable and fair for the two defendants
8. Id.
9. Id. In libel law:
a retraction is both an apology and an effort to set the record straight. At common
law a prompt and honest retraction is usually relevant to the questions of whether the
article was published with malice and whether the plaintiff's reputation was actually
harmed. In several states which have retraction statutes, a plaintiff must give the
publisher an opportunity to retract the libel before a suit may be started. If the
publisher promptly honors the request for a retraction and retracts the libelous mate-
rial in a place in the newspaper as prominent as the place in which the libel originally
appeared, the impact will reduce and in some instances cancel any damage judgment
the plaintiff might later seek in a lawsuit.
D. PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW 213-14 (1981).
10. The National Enquirer had a national and international circulation of over five mil-
lion. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1485 n.2. The number of copies which reach a forum state and the
manner in which they are distributed could be an important factor in a jurisdictional analysis.
In addition, the total circulation may also be important. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir.
1967); Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1978); Sipple v. Des Moines
Register and Tribune Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1978).
11. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1484. The other defendants did not question jurisdiction and an-
swered the complaint. Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1982).
12. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1485.
13. Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 187 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1982). See generally Scott,
Jurisdiction Over the Press: A Survey and Analysis, 32 FED. CoM. L.J. 19 (1980); Note, Juris-
diction Meets the Press: First Amendment Considerations in Jurisdictional Analysis, 9 HAS-
TINGS CONST. "L.Q. 975 (1982).
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to appear in California. 4 The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 15
In deciding the case, the Court used the standards articulated in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington. t6 Pursuant to that standard, the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution per-
mitted personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any state with which the
defendant has "certain minimum contacts. . . such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.'"17
As such, the analysis of these "minimum contacts" focuses on the
relationship between the defendant, the forum state seeking jurisdiction,
and the litigation itself.1 8  In light of these considerations, the Court
found that California had jurisdiction over Calder and South. Here, Cal-
ifornia was the focal point of both the story and the injury; the defend-
ants' activities directly targeted the plaintiff, and the suit arose from
those very same activities.' 9
The Court found further support for its decision because the Jones
story had certain "effects" in California.2° The story concerned the ac-
tivities of a California resident and impugned the reputation and profes-
sionalism of an individual whose career was centered in the state.
Moreover, the article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt
of the harm was suffered in California.2
14. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1485-86.
15. On appeal to the Supreme Court, probable jurisdiction was postponed. - U.S. -, 103
S. Ct. 1766 (1983). The Court concluded that jurisdiction by appeal did not lie. However,
treating the jurisdictional statement as a petition for writ of certiorari, the Court granted the
petition. - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1186.
16. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
17. In addition to the constitutional principles of due process, there must be an applicable
state rule or statute which potentially confers jurisdiction over the defendant. See Data Disc,
Inc., v. Systems Technology Assoc. Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (1977). California's "long arm"
statute is Section 410.10 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. It permits an assertion of
jurisdiction on any basis as long as it is consistent with the state and federal constitutions.
Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1485 n.5. Thus, the usual two-step analysis collapses into a single search
for the outer limits of due process. See Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 896
(1978).
18. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1486 (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)).
19. Jones, 52 U.S.L.W. at 4351. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. -, 104 S.
Ct. 1473 (1984). See also McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (holding that one
contact with the forum state may be enough for the cause of action to arise from that contact).
20. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-298 (1980). See
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Sec. 37 (1971) ("A state has power to
exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an act done
elsewhere .. ").
21. By analogy, it has long been established in products liability cases that jurisdiction can
be based on the commission of an isolated act in the forum if the cause of action sued upon
stems from the defendant's acts. See Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 181 (2d
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Calder and South ineffectively argued that they were not responsible
for the circulation of the story, had no control over its marketing, and
had no economic stake in sales of the Enquirer. Citing the case of World-
Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,2 2 they contended that "the mere fact that
they [could] foresee the article [would] be circulated and have an effect"
in California was insufficient for jurisdiction.23
The two defendants also attempted to distinguish their situation
from those of manufacturers held liable for shipping a product to another
state where it subsequently malfunctions and causes injury.24 They
maintained that those particular cases were not controlling because Cal-
der and South derived no direct benefit and had no supervision over sales
in the distant state.25
The Court was unpersuaded and held that South and Calder were
"not charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their intentional
and allegedly tortious actions were expressly aimed at California."26 Ac-
cording to the Court, the defendants acted with the knowledge that the
story would have a potentially devastating impact in California, the state
of the Enquirer's largest circulation, and that the brunt of the injury
would have its greatest effect in the state where Shirley Jones lived and
worked.27
Although the Court agreed that each defendant's activities deserved
an individual analysis apart from the Enquirer,2" their status as employ-
ees did not shield them from jurisdiction where there had been joint par-
ticipation in an intentional act of alleged libel. Thus, there was nothing
unfair in compelling the defendants to answer in California for their ac-
tions, 29 and both Calder and South could "reasonably anticipate being
haled into court there."3°
Such a reaffirmation of the holding in World- Wide Volkswagen 1 is a
Cir. 1967); Cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 213 (1977). See generally Scott, Jurisdiction
Over the Press: A Survey and Analysis, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 19, 21 n.13 (1980).
22. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
23. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1487 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295).
24. E.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969); Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
25. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1487.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
29. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1487.
30. Id. (citing World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297) (foreseeability that a product will
enter the forum less critical to the analysis than the defendant's conduct and connection with
the forum such that he should "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.").
31. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). It is questionable why the Court heard Jones in the first place. If
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positive statement on behalf of allegedly libeled plaintiffs like Shirley
Jones. Basically, jurisdiction will still be proper if a court can determine
that the acts of the transgressor satisfy this test of "reasonable
anticipation.
' 32
Despite the Court's concentration on this concept, Calder v. Jones
may be noted in the future for reasons only casually addressed by the
decision.
In the process of holding Calder and South amenable to California's
long-arm jurisdiction, the Supreme Court quickly dismissed any con-
cerns that the first amendment was being compromised by infringing
upon the freedom of the press. The Court completely eliminated the first
amendment from the jurisdictional analysis. "The infusions of such con-
siderations would needlessly complicate an already imprecise inquiry."33
According to the Court, any "chill" on the first amendment was already
taken into account in the substantive law governing libel. 34 The Court
was explicitly worried about "double counting," that is, having to con-
front first amendment problems at both the procedural and substantive
stages of the litigation.35
Such cavalier treatment of the first amendment holds serious impli-
cations for members of the media as it unwittingly trods on precarious
Constitutional territory.36 The substantive law upon which the Court
relies is deceptively unprotective of most members of the media, and such
a holding will undoubtedly have a detrimental effect on the first
amendment.
Prior to Calder v. Jones, the interface between the first amendment
and the jurisdictional analysis had suffered from inconsistent juggling by
it stands for nothing more than a reaffirmation of World- Wide Volkswagen, then the Court's
time was poorly spent. It cannot be discounted that this involved two high visibility litigants-
Shirley Jones and The National Enquirer-who have definite good-guy/bad-guy images. Nev-
ertheless, the final outcome should not have differed even if this case had involved Newsweek
or The New York Times. Cf. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1423
(1984) (companion to the Jones case, Keeton involved Kathy Keeton, who was affiliated with
"Viva" and "Penthouse" magazines, and who sued Hustler Magazine for libel.).
32. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. There was a further indication that the
defendants had actual knowledge that harm would result from their acts. When South tele-
phoned Jones's husband, Marty Ingels, from Florida and read him the story, Ingels became
emotionally upset and physically ill. Jones v. Calder, 138 Cal. App. 3d 128, 131, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 825, 827 (1982).
33. Id. See generally Note, Jurisdiction Meets the Press: First Amendment Considerations
in Jurisdictional Analysis, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1982).
34. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
35. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1487.
36. Consider that this was a unanimous decision by the Court.
1985]
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the lower courts leading to unpredictable results.37 By completely elimi-
nating the weight of the Constitution from the balance scale of the analy-
sis, the Court expressly settled the controversy. As such, the Supreme
Court held that adequate constitutional protections were already in place
and that such cases as New York Times v. Sullivan38 and Gertz v. Welch39
maintained the standards which defended the press from impermissible
attack.4°
Despite such endorsement, the Court's faith in the "actual malice"
test of New York Times, as modified by Gertz, is misplaced. The substan-
tive law is flawed in its application.41 First, it best protects those who
need it least-the large institutional media organizations like the Los An-
geles Times, Newsweek or CBS who can afford attorneys, costly litiga-
tion, travel to distant states and libel insurance to pay damages. Most
members of the media do not enjoy those benefits. In order to survive,
they often have to attract attention by covering controversial or unpopu-
lar issues and stories. Therefore, by taking these risks, they become
much more susceptible to libel suits.
42
Second, the substantive law has a built-in bias which favors the
mainstream press. By its nature, the conventional media focuses on indi-
viduals and public officials who have already been elevated to the status
of "public figures" as a result of media attention.43 In many cases, since
37. See New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966); Buckley v. New
York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964) (both giving special, considerations to the first
amendment); Contra Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967) (rejecting
first amendment considerations); Anselmi v. Denver Post, Inc., 552 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1977)
(leaving first amendment considerations until trial); Church of Scientology v. Adams, 584 F.2d
893 (9th Cir. 1978) (rejecting first amendment considerations and arguments and using a prod-
ucts liability standard).
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (preventing damages against a newspaper for defamatory state-
ments and placing the burden of proof on the victimized public official to show that the pub-
lisher acted with "actual malice"-that the statement was made with knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth). See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967);
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
39. 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (defining the scope of defamatory liability with respect to private
individuals); See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
40. Jones, 104 S. Ct. at 1448.
41. See generally Anderson, The Selective Impact of Libel Law, 14 COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. 38 (1975), reprinted in MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT (K.S. Devol, ed. 1979)
at 237.
42. Id.
43. The term "public figure," includes artists, athletes, business people, dilettantes, and
anyone who is famous or infamous because of who he is or what he has done. These public
figures may have also assumed roles of special prominence in society by thrusting themselves
into the spotlight of public controversy in order to influence the outcome. See generally D.
PEMBER, MASS MEDIA LAW (2d ed. 1981).
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these high profile individuals must prove "actual malice" on the part of
the press, the mainstream media operate on safer ground" than their
smaller counterparts which tend to spotlight less prominent individuals
and issues.45
Third, wealthy litigants have better access to lawyers and the legal
system. This enables them to prevent volatile situations, defend them
when necessary and, when a victim is concerned, bring the full power of
the legal system to bear on a defendant.46
The common denominator in each of the aforementioned factors is
money. By ignoring these considerations in the jurisdictional analysis
and misconstruing the effectiveness of constitutional protections, the
Court increases the susceptibility of the media to law suits. Given to-
day's six and seven figure judgments and the overall high cost of dealing
with the legal system,47 even the most frivolous complaint could imperil
the very existence of certain members of the media. Taken to its logical
conclusion, self-censorship by the media becomes an unattractive but
foreseeable alternative to the possibility of litigation.
If publication is seen as a process by which an idea becomes dissemi-
nated, self-censorship prevents communication from ever rising to the
level where the Court's so-called constitutional protections can take ef-
fect. "Actual malice" is a moot and toothless defense. If no communica-
tion ever takes place and the idea remains solely in the mind of the
communicator,48 this is nothing more or less than an unmistakable prior
44. See generally Anderson, The Selective Impact of Libel Law, 14 COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. 38 (1975).
45. Id. See also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979) ("Those charged with defa-
mation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making a claimant a public
figure.") (quoting Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 167-68 (1979)).
46. See generally Anderson, The Selective Impact of Libel Law, 14 COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. 38 (1975).
47. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Lando's deposition alone took more than one
year, filled twenty-six volumes of nearly 3,000 pages and 240 exhibits-not to mention the cost
to the journalists of being diverted from newsgathering. See Note, Jurisdiction Meets the Press:
First Amendment Considerations in Jurisdictional Analysis, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 977
n. 13 (1982). In 1975, the minimum cost of defending a libel suit was approximately $20,000.
The successful defense of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), was nearly
$100,000. In 1985, General William C. Westmoreland's case against CBS for $120 million was
abruptly dropped after 2 years of expensive pre-trial maneuvering, discovery, and 18 weeks of
testimony. Although many felt Westmoreland was bound to lose, few media organizations
could have sustained such an expensive, time consuming attack. Sharbutt, Polling Jury After
Libel Suit L.A. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, § 6 at 1, col. 6. The General's expenses exceeded $3
million. The General's Retreat, NEWSWEEK, March 4, 1985, at 59.
48. After Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 160 (1979), even the mental process of news-
gathering is fair game for the courts. The ruling in this case allows the courts to examine an
editor's psychological motivations.
1985]
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restraint on the freedom of the press.49
Although truth has always been subject to the protections of the
Constitution, falsity has not been accorded the same treatment. In fact,
it has been said that anyone who is silenced by the law never had any-
thing to say that was worth hearing.5" Many would argue that the Na-
tional Enquirer, Hustler Magazine,51 and many other popular
publications are within that scope. This note makes no such determina-
tion. Nevertheless, the very popularity of such publications only serves
to magnify an already complicated debate as the courts attempt to draw
bright lines of demarcation respecting the value of such printed and pub-
lished materials to society's well-being. Any limitation must certainly
have its cost on the first amendment.
Likewise, Calder v. Jones enacts its toll on basic freedom. It forces a
wedge into the courtroom door and widens the crack for plaintiffs at-
tempting to haul the press into court. Whether society will accept the
cost remains to be seen. Nevertheless, this decision is especially danger-
ous to the small, independent members of the media who sometimes offer
the only alternative to mainstream opinion and are already disadvan-
taged by the selectivity of current libel law. As disseminators of contro-
versial and often unpopular views, these members of the press provide
the public with information that stimulates the debate essential to our
free market society of ideas.5 2
By emphasizing procedural form over Constitutional substance, the
Court has ignored the very real impact of that procedure on first amend-
ment rights. If self-censorship is the by-product of Calder, then the
Court has indirectly accomplished what the first amendment expressly
49. The first amendment prohibits the imposition of a restraint on a publication before it is
published. Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S. 697 (1931). The Nixon administration in 1971 ac-
complished what no other administration had dared to suggest. Even though the decision in
The New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), seemed an apparent victory
for journalists by allowing the publication of "The Pentagon Papers," it was an illusory vic-
tory. The Nixon administration silenced some of the most respected newspapers in the coun-
try: The New York Times for 15 days, the Washington Post for 11 days, the Boston Globe for
eight days, and the St. Louis Dispatch for four days. Furthermore, it had induced the Chris-
tian Science Monitor to censor itself with the threat of a lawsuit. Landau, Free at Last, at
Least, 59 THE QUILL 7 (1971).
50. See generally Chafee, Freedom of Speech as I See It, 18 JOURNALISM Q. 158 (1941)
reprinted in MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT (K.S. Devol, ed. 1979) at 69-70; Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) ("no constitutional value in false statements of
fact.").
51. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984).
52. See generally MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT (K.S. Devol, ed. 1979); Note,
Jurisdiction Meets the Press: First Amendment Considerations in Jurisdictional Analysis, 9





53. In the companion case of Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984),
Kathy Keeton, who was associated with "Penthouse," "Viva," and "Omni" magazines, sued
"Hustler," a "men's" magazine. Over the course of several years, Keeton had attempted to
bring an action for defamation against Hustler-first in Ohio where Hustler was incorporated
and later in New York. In each instance, she was barred by the statute of limitations. She
finally brough suit in New Hampshire, the only state where the statute of limitations had not
run. The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was proper in New Hampshire, even though
neither of the litigants had many contacts with the state and most of the injury had occurred
elsewhere. The Court reasoned that Hustler's direct exploitation of the New Hampshire mar-
ket, although minimal, placed the magazine under the auspices of the World- Wide Volkswagen
doctrine, in that the defendant could "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." 444
U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). Nevertheless, by allowing Kathy Keeton to "forum shop" for a
favorable statute of limitations, this seems to be a subtle about-face for the Court. In dis-
missing the argument against Keeton's actions, the Court chalked it up to mere "litigation
strategy." Keeton, 104 S. Ct. at 1480. In a long line of cases including Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), and
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the courts had felt that there was inherent discrimina-
tion in allowing a litigant, usually a plaintiff, to apply different rules of law against an oppo-
nent. If a litigant could get different results, this would lead to inconsistencies and inequitable
protection under the law. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-77.
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